kaeporaNadim Kobeissi
@zooko @moxie And that, too, sir, is addressed. I gave an hour-long talk with the sole purpose of answering such questions. Watch it first.
moxieMoxie Marlinspike
@kaepora I did better and looked at the code. All handwaving aside, I'm asking about the current situation, not the potential future @zooko
RiptideTemporaRiptide Tempora
@kaepora if @moxie didn't have a reputable history of technological competence, I would ask why you even bother with that elitist prick. :\
moxieMoxie Marlinspike
@kaepora It shouldn't take more than 140 chars to explain how it's not as simple as a) breaking SSL, or b) being the operator. (@zooko)
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@moxie @zooko I think that @kaepora is working on a plugin for the Tor Browser which makes it 0) Tor Hidden Services & 1) local plugin
abditumGriffin Boyce
@moxie Attacker would also need to serve rotten .js to all parties, and it's available as a hidden service @ioerror @zooko @kaepora
abditumGriffin Boyce
@moxie If the concern is MITM, virtually all services are vulnerable in some way, key = minimization vs elimination @ioerror @zooko @kaepora
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@abditum @moxie @zooko @kaepora The issue is that a MITM can load and run code on your machine. It's not just about cryptographic MITM.
abditumGriffin Boyce
@ioerror This is true (recent Uyghur malware comes to mind), but all parties would need to be targeted to be efective @moxie @zooko @kaepora
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @abditum @moxie @zooko When a user is only vulnerable to a cryptographic MITM, cryptocat will be up to speed with normal OTR.
kaeporaNadim Kobeissi
@ioerror @abditum @moxie @zooko Of course - Cryptocat 2 will provide OTR over XMPP. We're releasing the first public beta this summer =)
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @abditum @moxie @zooko Both of those changes do not address the fact that a server can give you whatever it wants or break it, etc
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @abditum @moxie @zooko I know you understand but as I predicted, you're getting static for not loudly disclaiming those facts...
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @abditum @moxie The experience @zooko had is a great example of how the future doesn't matter as much as present realities.
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @abditum @moxie Yes, someday @zooko's bitcoin friend will be safer but not now and perhaps, not ever, if that is their first keyex
kaeporaNadim Kobeissi
@zooko Absolutely. Cryptocat Project details what Cryptocat can and can't do + best usage practices: project.crypto.cat/about/ @ioerror @moxie
kaeporaNadim Kobeissi
@zooko We are also designing a multilingual Cryptocat field guide with usage info, distributed freely in digital/print @ioerror @moxie
joelknightonJoel Knighton
@kaepora If the local browser extension is the preferred method, shouldn't it be linked to on the homepage at least? @zooko @ioerror @moxie
moxieMoxie Marlinspike
@joelknighton Yeah, buried pretty far in there. @kaepora, do you really believe this is only a "theoretical" problem? @zooko @ioerror
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@moxie @joelknighton @kaepora @zooko While not exactly perfect, I feel like every cryptocat user should be prompted for a local install.
kaeporaNadim Kobeissi
@ioerror @moxie @zooko Here is a serious proposition: Would it satisfy you if Cryptocat 2 (OTR over XMPP in browser) was local app only?
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @moxie @zooko That question doesn't even make sense. Do you mean a native app like Pidgin (minus the 0day)? Or an app in browser?
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @moxie @zooko In general, I think the right answer is to make people install a browser extension from a trusted site and use a tag.
DymaxionEleanor Saitta
@ioerror @kaepora @moxie @zooko ...and for people who can't install anything, but *will* talk regardless? Why not offer them *something*?
moxieMoxie Marlinspike
@Dymaxion CC-web is reducible to the security of SSL alone. My assertion is that this means gchat is more secure. @ioerror @kaepora @zooko
DymaxionEleanor Saitta
@moxie @ioerror @kaepora @zooko Different logging profiles and political orientation of server operators may have some real world effect too
wiretappedLeif Ryge
@quinnnorton @ioerror @kaepora @moxie @zooko all security tools should inform users in plain terms of some specific attacks they do not stop
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @moxie @zooko Remember when I suggested that? The server could advertise itself in html, etc. Local code required to use it.
ioerrorJacob Appelbaum
@kaepora @moxie @zooko When the chat feature works without a local plugin, people are happy but also not actually secure at all.
DymaxionEleanor Saitta
@ioerror @kaepora @moxie @zooko This is not completely true. There are adversary profiles where this is at least temporarily useful.
maradyddMeredith L Patterson
@ioerror @moxie @joelknighton @kaepora @zooko Yes. Presenting known concerns and mitigation options upfront is an ethical imperative.
moxieMoxie Marlinspike
@kaepora I don't understand this logic. It's like saying "because GPG exists, it's OK that hushmail in insecure." @ioerror @abditum @zooko
moxieMoxie Marlinspike
@kaepora If your position is that people should be using the alternatives, then take away the insecure option? @ioerror @abditum @zooko